TNAG-1038-FCO40-1288-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1981 — Page 130

DSR 11C

(c) Hong Kong Chinese intermediary and Hony Leong / Macao Office;

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dialogue begun by Sir P Cradock and Ke Hua;

(b) Political Adviser and NCNA, Hong Kong;

(d) Ministers during Prime Minister's visit to Peking

next year (if appropriate at that time).

Butish admnicitration

termuiate

British administral wi

Acquiescence)

Conclusions

6. (a) Likely result: UK formal rendition in return for

Le coupled withi clear statement on preservation of, status quo. Preferably an

in form of agreement that neither side will change status of

Hong Kong, without giving prescribed period of notice.

such an agreemus. only We should aim to achieve latter in exchange for

(b)

' acknowledgement' of Chinese statements on sovereignty. Consursust in possible new to amud desciable Agreement on changing/Order in Council a pre-requisite.

(c) Should be prepared to accept official representation

and formal right of consultation in certain defined areas.

Should also be prepared to concede sovereignty, but should

be held in reserve.

(d) Should not agree to Chinese rights of veto in

administration within medium-term (ie status quo) package.

Probably unavoidable in longer-term.

(e)

Chinese offer to respect land leases in return

Of

for representation the minimum grounds for agreement.

short-term value, but would set precedent for further action.

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