TNAG-1038-FCO40-1288-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1981 — Page 129

DSR 11C

SECRET

-3-

joint government or Chinese government by proxy: probably

Inconsistent with preservation of status quo.

unworkable.

1

Would sow seed of future problems.

Should not be negotiable.

UK requirements

thor desire

4. (a)

F'under

undertaking that sovereignly

Wine be

Gwen p when thi nohis

expurd,

which would

of cours alth status

Sho

terminat British

administration,

Chinese agreement to period of notice, say 15 years,

of of intent to change status of Hong Kong. Probably best option

Notice, when finally given, would need

to revive confidence.

to be accompanied by positive guarantees by Chinese covering

transitional period. Limits Chinese manoeuvrability so

would probably be traded only for concession of sovereifaty.

Mat

recognition of sovereight

(b) Chinese acknowledgement of status que UK Briksh

could contchas

administration/ sine die. Would entail agreement to discount

1997. But would not limit Chinese moves on resumption, early

or late. May revive confidence, but not as reliably as (a).

Chinese would probably bargain for concession of sovereignty,

but acknowledgement may suffice.

(c) Chinese agreement to respect land leases expiring after

Chinese unfuthcoming so four 1997.

given.

Easier for Chinese. Adjunct to assurances already

Merely postpones problem for Hong Kong. Not worth

concession of sovereignty,

acquiescene in any ricersony

to/a

(d) Chinese agreement to amendment of 1898 Order in Council,

Donnecting providing for extension of UK administration appropriate to

(a), (b) or (c). Necessary in UK law. Chinese have opposed

in past, but will probably agree in face of crisis.

Negotiation

5.

Possible between:

(a) officials in Peking or London: out of continuing

/dialogue

SECRET