TNAG-1003-FCO40-1240-Evacuation-of-UK-citizens-from-Dependent-Territories-militar-1981 — Page 3

From:

Mr k T Jackling

Head of DB 11

1) Enter with pps to

2) mm. mayne!

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ho weed you in to attend meeting we could receive me card.

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3Brett RR

2714

HKG

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SECRET.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Main Building, Whitehall, London SWIA 2HB

Telephone (Direct Dialling) 01-218

(Switchboard) 01-218 9000

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2 7 APR 1981

DESK efficre

PA

RESISTRY Action Taken

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D/DS11/10/6

LAST PAPER

24 April 1981

South American Department

RH Smith Esq

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Dear Soulz,

FALKLAND ISLANDS

Thank you for your letter of 6 April. &

2. I agree that, in the light of what you say about the future of negotiations over the Falkland Islands, it may be useful to have an up-to-date appreciation of the means available, and the extent of our ability, to counter certain types of Argentine military action against the Islands. But if this appreciation is to encompass "contingency plans", as you suggest, we shall need to be clear precisely what contingencies we are considering. The 1977 paper is probably a helpful starting point, but it may be useful to consider again, in the light of such intelligence as we have, what the likely military threats now are. Which types of Argentine military action, for example, do we think would lead to the evacuation of the population? In the event of an evacua- tion, would we be thinking of further military action? Perhaps we would be contemplating`an evacuation only of "women and children": if so, how many people? I raise these queries be- cause HMG does not seem to have given much thought to the possibility of an evacuation in recent years, the subject is obviously an extremely sensitive one and the FCO have not previously stated a requirement for a plan for the Service- assisted or Service-protected evacuation of the Islands (nor, of course, do we have a current formal plan for their reinforcement, though perhaps we should). If such plans are now required, we shall need some further detailed advice from the FCO. I believe that both our Departments should also think quite carefully about the political/military scenarios that are envisaged, so that we can define the information we need about the availability of forces and how they might be deployed. On matters of this sort we find that it is useful to think quite carefully in advance how military contingency plans should be developed and with what objectives in mind.

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