CONFIDENTIAL
GUANGDONG NUCLEAR POWER PROJECTS
ORGANISATION AND CONTROL
In the previous inter Departmental paper circulated by the Secretary of State for Industry on 18 February, 1980, we said that we would keep in touch with the KEC/CLP negotiations and participate as and when necessary especially on the Executive Group. We also recommended that the UK offer direct technical support and the 1st May letter from Sir Jack Rampton to Sir John Hill asked that Walter Marshall should lead a team of technical advisers. The implications of their role as "independent assessors" was stressed.
Hence an "A" team headed by Dr. Marshall with technical representation and Whiteall observers was established together with a "B" team of Whitehall and commercial interests.
Events have however developed and the Whitehall Committee is invited to consider the appropriateness of current arrangements.
First, the mask of Dr. Marshall's neutrality has been removed by the Chinese who now apparently want direct involvement by HMG.
Second, both Sir Lawrence Kadoorie and Bill Stones accept that HMG will have to assume a greater responsibility and intervention with possible attendance of the remaining Executive Committee meetings.
Thirdly, the project is now recognised to be of such significance in political as well as commercial terms that it demands much greater co-ordination than has so far been possible or would be possible if technical and commercial considerations were divorced.
Fourthly, Dr. Marshall recognises this and has recently been pursuing his own commercial negotiations. In this he has been exceeding his remit with potentially damaging consequences for HMG's overall control of the project and UK relations with CLP (BTC 119 and 122 from Hong Kong refer)
One solution might be to abandon the distinction between A and B teams and establish regular meetings of a central co-ordinating committee which would consist of the members of the Whitehall policy group plus:
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