TNAG-0950-FCO40-1169-Effect-of-nuclear-exports-to-China-on-Hong-Kong-Guangdong-nu-1980 — Page 14

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and the fuel contract and then try and claw back some of it in subsequent negotia-

tions. It would be better tactics to offer the French the NSSS, claim the BONP con-

ional plant and fuel for ourselves and have the French claw back some of that.

However, if that was to be done, it was essential that the negotiation with the

French should be led by NNC with BNFL and GEC in support because we would not be

proposing to sacrifice any part of GEC's participation and the difficult compromise

would have to be carried out by NNC. It would be unforgivable if we attempted to

make that negotiation ourselves and then presented NNC with a fait accompli.

Sir Sidney Gordon accepted that all this was the tactics of the negotiation and

were not for him to determine. Kadoorie concluded that if we were going to work

with the French it seemed that we were approaching a consensus view. He himself

was looking for a compromise.

7. M

Dr Marshall said, however, that all this was too fresh to come to any

decisions. He demanded time to think about the implications of Kadoorie's change

of heart on NII safety standards and he wanted time to consult with his industrial

colleagues about whether such a French package would actually be workable. He

still had reservations about an early approach to the French but he had serious

reservations about any approach at all at any time in advance of an agreement

amongst the British interests on what we were trying to achieve. That agreement

would need blessing from Kadoorie and Sir Sidney Gordon and it was essential

to bring in Bill Stones because his participation in bringing the deal off was

essential.

At this point the meeting had to break off because of the necessity

to get the aeroplane to London.

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