TNAG-0950-FCO40-1169-Effect-of-nuclear-exports-to-China-on-Hong-Kong-Guangdong-nu-1980 — Page 13

COMMAL INI GOMFIDENCE

could meet those standards without difficulty whereas Framatome would meet them

with some problems. That general advice still remained true but the most recent

evolution of thinking in the UK concerning the design of the BONP gave such

further emphasis to that advice that a French BONP meeting British safety standards

now looked uncomfortable but not impossible. Given this explanation, Kadoorie

felt that the right thing to do was to relax his insistence on British safety standards and hopefully look for some compromise. He was now entirely convinced that the nuclear island contract should go to the French and we must simply accommodate ourselves to that business judgement.

Furthermore, Kadoorie was somewhat sceptical about the British/American

approach on safety, indicating that in his view it would be regarded as a new unproven system and he referred to too high standards being proposed from British

interests generally, giving as an example development of special switchgear

developed to CEGB specification which had been put in a bid for conventional

plant. In the event, the special switchgear was replaced by other more conven-

tional and cheaper gear, the inference being that care should be taken by the British not to set standards which were unnecessarily high.

There was a long discussion on the manner in which a package could be

put together. In Kadoorie's opinion, which he said was a business judgement, if

the British attempted to persuade the French to supply only the NSSS and not the

BONP, then the French would put in their own bid and the British would get nothing.

He believed it was a matter of urgency that a joint bid should be put together,

letting the French have the nuclear island and the British the conventional island.

He admitted that at the moment he believes that an overall French bid is very

vague but remained convinced that any attempt to prevent the French taking the whole nuclear island would result in a pre-emptive French bid. He also indicated that in his opinion there should be no splitting of the nuclear island, that the

Chinese would not accept this and that the firm who accept the nuclear island should accept 100% responsibility for it.

Sir Sidney Gordon had rather different ideas. He would like to see a

GEC/Franatome agreement, he would like to see NNC as the architect/engineer and he

thought it ought to be possible to get agreement that the French supply the NSSS

and there should be some compromise on the supply of the BONP. Dr Marshall did

not disagree with that judgement as a realistic end point of a negotiation but he argued that it was simply bad tactics to offer the French the nuclear island

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