TNAG-0948-FCO40-1167-Effect-of-nuclear-exports-to-China-on-Hong-Kong-Guangdong-nu-1980 — Page 187

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

11. China is already a nuclear weapon state. The question of prolifer-

ation as such does not arise. We shall wish to seek adequate assurances

from the Chinese that any nuclear equipment or material supplied for civil

purposes is not diverted to her weapons programme and such assurances are

likely to be necessary to secure the agreement of our COCOM partners.

12. We have no obligation to insist on safeguards from a nuclear weapon

state. We can encourage the Chinese to follow the example of the three

Western NWS and accept safeguards voluntarily. The Chinese have however

made it plain that inspection is currently unacceptable to them. Supply

without safeguards to China is likely to stiffen resistance to the accept-

ance of safeguards in India, where equality of status with China is an

important psychological factor.

13. It will be desirable to seek from the Chinese certain other assur-

ances regarding retransfer and physical protection (against terrorists)

which we already seek from all our nuclear customers including nuclear

weapons states.

14. Detailed negotiations on these points will be best left until it

is clear who the suppliers of nuclear materials and equipment may be.

But the Chinese will be looking for an early indication of our basic

acceptance that safeguards are not required of them, and an exchange on

this and on the possibility of voluntary offer safeguards being accept-

able should take place soon.

CONFIDENTIAL