CONFIDENTIAL
FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
11. China is already a nuclear weapon state. The question of prolifer-
ation as such does not arise. We shall wish to seek adequate assurances
from the Chinese that any nuclear equipment or material supplied for civil
purposes is not diverted to her weapons programme and such assurances are
likely to be necessary to secure the agreement of our COCOM partners.
12. We have no obligation to insist on safeguards from a nuclear weapon
state. We can encourage the Chinese to follow the example of the three
Western NWS and accept safeguards voluntarily. The Chinese have however
made it plain that inspection is currently unacceptable to them. Supply
without safeguards to China is likely to stiffen resistance to the accept-
ance of safeguards in India, where equality of status with China is an
important psychological factor.
13. It will be desirable to seek from the Chinese certain other assur-
ances regarding retransfer and physical protection (against terrorists)
which we already seek from all our nuclear customers including nuclear
weapons states.
14. Detailed negotiations on these points will be best left until it
is clear who the suppliers of nuclear materials and equipment may be.
But the Chinese will be looking for an early indication of our basic
acceptance that safeguards are not required of them, and an exchange on
this and on the possibility of voluntary offer safeguards being accept-
able should take place soon.
CONFIDENTIAL