TNAG-0932-FCO40-1151-Relations-between-Hong-Kong-and-China-1980 — Page 64

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following principles should be established (and at Mr Li'e zoge handed over a copy):

3.

(a)

(b)

(c)

both vessels remain on the scene providing

there is no danger to life or the safety

of the vessels until both Captains have

exchanged statements giving their version

of the events;

no more than 2 assisting vessels should then be deployed by either side unless there are over-riding considerations of ship's safety;

if it is necessary to have further follow-up action on the incident, this should be done through the existing channels (i.e. NCNA and PA's office) and not on the spot.

Mr Li thanked Dr Wilson for his remarks, in particular his suggestion that the 2 incidents should be taken into account. Such incidents must not be allowed to affect good relations. On both occasions there was damage and on the first one more had been suffered by the Chinese boat. On the Chinese side some people had

therefore been worried. It was impossible to fix precisely the responsibility for these incidents. However, the problem was not so great. Vice-Governor Wang Ning was concerned to find a sensible solution and his ideas were similar to Dr Wilson's. It was important

not to let such incidents get out of hand when they occurred.

4.

His immediate impression was that the practice on the Chinese side was similar to that in Hong Kong, but at the local level on both sides perhaps higher instructions were not always followed.

(Dr Wilson interjected that this was not true on the Hong Kong side). He would pass the suggested principles for handling such incidents to the authorities in Guangdong and also those in Fujian, reminding Dr Wilson of a case in 1978 in which a Fujian vessel had not

followed the correct instructions.

CONFIDENTIAL

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