TNAG-0894-FCO40-1104-Refugees-from-Vietnam-in-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-boat-people-1979 — Page 79

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27. There is unlikely to be further substantive discussion of the details of the Commission proposals in Geneva. It will be for Foreign Affairs Council on 24 July to review the outcome of the Geneva Conference and to take decisions on the proposals which have been put forward by the Commission. We welcome the part which the Community evidently wishes to play in helping the Vietnamese refugees, subject to the competence point referred to in paragraph 5(a) above. We hope that, following Geneva, the Foreign Affairs Council will take decisions which will confirm the Community's readiness to play a constructive role.

Multilateral Aid

28. Vietnam is a member of the World Bank Group, with access to IDA

funds, and linked EEC Special Action Credits, Kuwait Fund Credits etc.

The Asian Developmetn Bank and OPEC Special Fund have also made loans.

The total over which the UK has any potential influence is about

US$ 100 million in 1978-79. The UK, with its friends, has some

potential ability to block further loans from certain of these sources,

but to do so would be inconsistent with the more general aim of keeping

decisions in such organisations as the World Bank technical rather than

political. Under the previous administration, the UK commented on the

human rights performance of various states when loans to them were under

discussion, but without the effect of preventing their approval. The

Government has decided that we shall in future oppose such loans to

Vietnam: but we

are unlikely to succeed in blocking them in the face

of support for the principle that such decisions should not be based

on political considerations. Any effective action would need to be

concerted.

UN Agencies

29.

Vietnam receives substantial assistance from UN sources primarily

from UNDP, and the World Food Programme, amounting to about 8 120 million

in 1978.

30. The allocation of aid from all UN bodies is decided by the General

Assembly or by the governing bodies of the Agencies concerned. While in

any one of them it would be open to us to call for a suspension of aid

to Vietnam (but see paragraph 5 below) we could not expect to carry the

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