TNAG-0887-FCO40-1097-Refugees-from-Vietnam-in-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-boat-people-1979 — Page 162

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3. EVEN SO, ARGUMENTS PRESENTED BY US ALONE WILL NOT BE EFFECTIVE. THE ONLY FULLY EFFECTIVE COURSE WOULD BE ONE WHICH

CONVINCED THE RUSSIANS THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THE ASEAN COUNTRIES

TO VIETNAM AND TO THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED BY A CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION. THE RUSSIANS

DO NOT WANT TO END UP WITH A POLARISED SOUTH EAST ASIA, WHERE THEIR GAINS IN VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA ARE OFFSET

SY A LOSS OF INFLUENCE IN THE ASEAN COUNTRIES. LEVERAGE HERE NEEDS

TO BE APPLIED AT LEAST IN THE FIRST INSTANCE BY THE ASEAN COUNTRIES THEMSELVES, AND BY APPROACHING THE RUSSIANS

RATHER THAN THE VIETNAMESE. SIMILAR ACTION BY OTHER REGIONAL FOWERS, ESPECIALLY THE INDIANS, COULD ALSO BE VERY USEFUL.

IN GENERAL THE SOVIET REACTION TO ANY BRITISH APPROACH

WILL BE COLOURED BY THEIR ASSESSMENT OF OUR POLICY TOWARDS

CHINA (THEY ARGUE THAT OUR POLICIES ENCOURAGE CHINESE AMBITIONS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA AND ARE BOUND TO CAUSE US TROUBLE). CONSEQUENTLY, APART FROM THE PRIORITY TO ASEAN REPRESENTATIONS, IT WOULD

BE HELPFUL IF THE AMERICANS (AND PERHAPS ALSO THE WEST GERMANS

AND FRENCH) WERE PREPARED TO DEPLOY THE ARGUMENT IN YOUR PARA 4(C),

KEEBLE

FILES.

H+KIGO(i)

UND

SEAD. EESD

Ps

PS/LORD PRIVY

SENL

Y'S / MRL BLACKER.

Pol Pus.

SIR A DUFF

MIL CONTAZ21

MMURA:

MRLERHY MRFERGUSṣorf

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