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3. EVEN SO, ARGUMENTS PRESENTED BY US ALONE WILL NOT BE EFFECTIVE. THE ONLY FULLY EFFECTIVE COURSE WOULD BE ONE WHICH
CONVINCED THE RUSSIANS THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THE ASEAN COUNTRIES
TO VIETNAM AND TO THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED BY A CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION. THE RUSSIANS
DO NOT WANT TO END UP WITH A POLARISED SOUTH EAST ASIA, WHERE THEIR GAINS IN VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA ARE OFFSET
SY A LOSS OF INFLUENCE IN THE ASEAN COUNTRIES. LEVERAGE HERE NEEDS
TO BE APPLIED AT LEAST IN THE FIRST INSTANCE BY THE ASEAN COUNTRIES THEMSELVES, AND BY APPROACHING THE RUSSIANS
RATHER THAN THE VIETNAMESE. SIMILAR ACTION BY OTHER REGIONAL FOWERS, ESPECIALLY THE INDIANS, COULD ALSO BE VERY USEFUL.
IN GENERAL THE SOVIET REACTION TO ANY BRITISH APPROACH
WILL BE COLOURED BY THEIR ASSESSMENT OF OUR POLICY TOWARDS
CHINA (THEY ARGUE THAT OUR POLICIES ENCOURAGE CHINESE AMBITIONS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA AND ARE BOUND TO CAUSE US TROUBLE). CONSEQUENTLY, APART FROM THE PRIORITY TO ASEAN REPRESENTATIONS, IT WOULD
BE HELPFUL IF THE AMERICANS (AND PERHAPS ALSO THE WEST GERMANS
AND FRENCH) WERE PREPARED TO DEPLOY THE ARGUMENT IN YOUR PARA 4(C),
KEEBLE
FILES.
H+KIGO(i)
UND
SEAD. EESD
Ps
PS/LORD PRIVY
SENL
Y'S / MRL BLACKER.
Pol Pus.
SIR A DUFF
MIL CONTAZ21
MMURA:
MRLERHY MRFERGUSṣorf
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