(a)
(b)
(c)
(a)
(e)
4.
On the first, while accepting ASEAN's anxiety not to be saddled with the residual problem UNHCR was unable to enter into firm commitments without the authority of the governments of the final re-settlement countries;
on the second, Hartling accepted that the Processing Centre should have a capacity of between 5000 and 10,000, though the rate of turnover would obviously be the important criterion. Mochtar added that if the Centre had had a larger capacity, there would be little pressure on those actually doing the
processing; furthermore he had no wish to offer an open invitation to Vietnam to accelerate the rate of exodus of Vientamese refugees;
on the third, Hartling also agreed that UNHCR would operate the Processing Centre;
on the fourth, Hartling agreed as this was standard UNHCR practice. Appeals for third party support would shortly be launched. Mochtar told us that Japan had not only agreed to support the Processing Centre financially but had set an entirely new precedent for herself by agreeing in principle to accept Vietnamese refugees into Japan for permanent settlement. The Japanese Ambassador had told him yesterday that 500 would be accepted; and
there were no problems on the fifth condition. contributions would, of course, be given to and through UNHCR.
All
As to Mochtar's discussions under paragraph 2. (b) above, he confirmed that he had never committed himself to the selection of Rempang Island as the Processing Centre. It had, in fact,
It had, in fact, three drawbacks:
(a) 2,335 resident inhabitants;
(b)
(c)
a sizeable part of it was swampland; and
although it had been used by the Indonesians in August 1945 as a processing centre for over a quarter of a million Japanese POWS, the island was almost totally lacking in infra-structure.
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AMANTHA
/A subsequent
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