TNAG-0839-FCO40-1048-Relations-between-Hong-Kong-and-China-1979 — Page 188

CONFIDENTIAL

followers, fearful of their position when Teng lies, may urge that he goes to the logical end. I find this a difficult question to answer and it is probably too early to attempt one.

But

I could foresee

some further adjustment, with Teng becoming Premier, leaving Hua as Party leader. Beyond that the evidence is still insufficient.

Unless either way I see no significant threat to modernisation. totally new leaders emerge it would be difficult to change radically the policies to which all are committed, albeit no doubt with differences of emphasis.

19.

This is I fear a long despatch.

But you invited me not only to comment on present developments, but also to cover their pre- and post-revolutionary background. It is also, as anything

But its attempting to explain China, incomplete and tentative. general message is a hopeful one in terms of British interests. We may expect some internal evolution in China, but not too rapid. This is as it should be: a too rapid evolution would be explosive and not in our interest. I do not expect the pot to boil over. I

The normalisation of relations with expect modernisation to stick. the United States can only confirm and strengthen the trend. have therefore, as I argued in my telegrams numbers 469, 470 and 471 of 31 July, an unprecedented opportunity to improve our relations, to multiply our exports, to assist China and thereby to assist international stability.

20.

Ve

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Moscow, Tokyo and Canberra and to the Governor of Hong Kong.

I have the honour to be

Sir

Your obedient Servant

مشمسة

Erey scartarle

ез

PERCY CRADOCK

CONFIDENTIAL