TNAG-0839-FCO40-1048-Relations-between-Hong-Kong-and-China-1979 — Page 153

CONFIDENTIAL

3.

DSR 11C

it "friendship" to the Chinese is a diplomatic instrument,

not an emotional commitment; we cannot, for example, be

expected to play out our own role in the "Three Worlds

system" on lines prescribed by the Chinese.

Misunderstand-

ing and conflicts of perception may thus well persist, and,

as you made clear, much will depend on the extent to which

the new leadership keep to the paths they have so recently

embarked upon.

4.

Nevertheless, the contacts my colleagues and I have

recently had with the Chinese bear out your view that there

is now hope for much improved understanding and scope for

a good measure of practical cooperation. Other Western

countries, notably the United States, Canada and the major

powers of Western Europe have clearly come to the same

So too have the Japanese and a growing

number of countries in S E Asia and the Pacific.

not want to be behind anyone else in seizing the

opportunities which the new situation may create for us.

conclusion.

We do

5.

We also have to take proper account of Soviet

apprehensions about China. Some kind of reconciliation

in the long term cannot be excluded, and we must watch out

for signs of it; but their antagonism is deep rooted and

seems likely to persist for the foreseeable future.

Soviet strength is at present more than adequate to cope

with any Chinese threat, real or imagined; Russian worries

relate to what China might ultimately become if she

succeeded in absorbing Western technology on a massive

scale. This raises the delicate question of the form

/in which

Dd 0532000 400M 5/78 HMSO Bracknell