CONFIDENTIAL
3.
DSR 11C
it "friendship" to the Chinese is a diplomatic instrument,
not an emotional commitment; we cannot, for example, be
expected to play out our own role in the "Three Worlds
system" on lines prescribed by the Chinese.
Misunderstand-
ing and conflicts of perception may thus well persist, and,
as you made clear, much will depend on the extent to which
the new leadership keep to the paths they have so recently
embarked upon.
4.
Nevertheless, the contacts my colleagues and I have
recently had with the Chinese bear out your view that there
is now hope for much improved understanding and scope for
a good measure of practical cooperation. Other Western
countries, notably the United States, Canada and the major
powers of Western Europe have clearly come to the same
So too have the Japanese and a growing
number of countries in S E Asia and the Pacific.
not want to be behind anyone else in seizing the
opportunities which the new situation may create for us.
conclusion.
We do
5.
We also have to take proper account of Soviet
apprehensions about China. Some kind of reconciliation
in the long term cannot be excluded, and we must watch out
for signs of it; but their antagonism is deep rooted and
seems likely to persist for the foreseeable future.
Soviet strength is at present more than adequate to cope
with any Chinese threat, real or imagined; Russian worries
relate to what China might ultimately become if she
succeeded in absorbing Western technology on a massive
scale. This raises the delicate question of the form
/in which
Dd 0532000 400M 5/78 HMSO Bracknell