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8.
We reminded Lowman of the claims that Hong Kong has for special consideration: the high level of legal and illegal immigration from China and the local political problems which this raises vis-a-vis our treatment of refugees from Vietnam - see para 2 above; the number of Hong Kong dependants brought back by special charter flights from Vietnam; UNHCR's accommodation problems; and not least, that despite our problems we have so far maintained a liberal policy in allowing all refugees on junks to land as well as all ocean-going vessels for which Hong Kong is the first scheduled port of call after rescue. Lowman expressed sympathy but understandably could give no under- taking of preferential treatment for Hong Kong. However, he was extremely grateful for our agreement to help guarantee the transit arrangements in Macau (para 4 above) and we hope that this, together with the higher costs to UNHCR of accommodation in Hong Kong, may help the US Consulate- General here to argue the case for a generous allocation of category 4 places to Hong Kong.
9.
We agreed
Lowman raised a number of other points. to try to help U N H C R find cheaper sources of accommodation here (so far none of the possibilities we have investigated have proved workable). He asked if we could help UNHCR reduce its costs by allowing refugees to work here while awaiting resettlement: we looked at the possibility of changing the terms under which refugees are landed but have concluded that the legal and political objections make it best simply to continue our present policy of turning a blind eye on those who manage to find remporary employment. Lowman also asked if we could do anything about the 20-odd long-term refugees who have turned down offers for countries other than the US (and are therefore ineligible to go to the US). We may be able to help here, possibly by persuading some of the refugees (preferably those with some Hong Kong connections) to settle here. Finally, Lowman asked if we could make a contribution to U N H C R. held out no suggestion of being able to do so and did not get the impression that he expected an encouraging response. Even if funds were available we imagine there could be constitutional objections to Hong Kong making a contribution: we should be grateful for any comments which you or H K & G D may have on this point. Incidentally, will the UK be making any further contribution to the U N H C R's South- East Asia programme beyond the £750,000 for the year ending March 1978, referred to in Mr Rowlands' written reply to a P Q on 17 May?
Internationalization
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I hope that this account of the problem will help you and UK M I S Geneva in making the case for a wider international response to it. I also enclose
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