TNAG-0775-FCO40-979-Possible-new-airport-for-Hong-Kong-1978 — Page 46

The accumulated losses to the economy between now and 1985, if Kai Tak is the sole air transport link available, are shown graphically in Figure 8.

LOSS (1973 THOUSAND MILLION SHK)

40

35

30

ACTUAL LOSS

1975 PRESENT VALUE

OF LOSS (10% DISCOUNT RATE)

25

25

20

15

10

5

I

AMP-

1985

1986

1987

1988 1989

1990

1991

1992 1993

1994 1995

YEAR

8.1

Figure 8 Losses to Economy from Demand Restraints

THE PENALTIES OF DELAY

Figure 9 indicates the magnitude of Hong Kong's capacity deficiency if a replacement for Kai Tak is not operational until 1990. The percentage loss in capacity ranges up to as high as 44% in 1990. The loss to the GDP will be similar, although it is assumed that partial recovery could begin in 1990.

Control of airline operations in the face of such drastic deficiencies in capacity would necessitate Government imposition of various travel constraint mechanisms. The implications of either active or passive policies to restrain growth in air transportion at Hong Kong in the face of declared policies of encouragement by most other nations in the region are far broader than those suggested by investigation of direct economic development consequences. The breadth of these im- plications, while beyond the scope of this investigation, nevertheless received varying degrees of consideration. In all probability, the position of Hong Kong as a hub for regional air transport and as a principal point on worldwide trunk routes would deteriorate rapidly when the restraint policies become evident.

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