San F
-3-
should realise also that there were political
problems for DT IC as well. HK's was not an
elected Government but that did not mean HK
could be governed without the consent of the people. Textiles represented 50% of HK's exports. The USA took 30% of this 50%; half of HK's manu-
facturing labour force was in the textile industry. The DTIC had the power to control exports under the law but could not exercise that power arbitrarily: it had to be done under the terms of the Agreement. The Agremment could be terminated but not until the end of 1979. Revisions of the Agreement could be proposed but there was nothing in it to say that the other party had to accept such revisions.
The
6.
STR said he understood this but the type of disruption which would be caused by a unilateral solution by the US would be one that was to the negative interests of both sides. risk was so great that he saw it as one to en- courage both parties to seek solutions in the apparel area where there had been surges of imports. Apparel imports had more than doubled in six years.
7.
DT IC asked what kind of disruption the STR envisaged if HK and the US could not find a mutual solution. STR responded by pointing to
the at titudes of certain congressmen. For example Senator Long wanted a 15% surcharge on textiles imports. He wanted the US to import wing
-U- ནལཁམ textiles-only to the amoun. that the S-textile industry-exported on a bilateral basis.
These
ideas had a great deal of support in the Senate. This extreme view was not however shared by sa
others such as Mr. Pibicoff Chairman of the Tride Committee. The days when the kills of Wilbur Mills were available to deal with tricky political
*
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.