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those pressures.
3.
STR said that the pressures were general. In the HK context, they were particularly focussed on textiles, and textiles was the most sensitive of several sensitive political areas. Unless the US could deal witla them with the assistance of IK, the MTN package would nov get through Congress. He was not playing games; ho needed HK's help for a constructive solution.
4.
DT IC said that HK saw the matter somewhat
differently. K saw a US textile industry which for 20· years had received more protection than any other except perhaps farmers. The MFA did not override the GATT. Therefore, the exercise of GATT Article XIX rights was
available to the US, provided the ITC had found, after
considering a petition from the textile industry, that imports were the cause of its difficulties. As far as
he knew the US industry had not filed such a petition and had not done so for several years. STR interjccted to say that the reason for this over the past 18 months was due to the efforts of Ambassador Smith. The ITC would
love to get its hands on such a reference. STR agreed
that the route outlined by DTIC was open to the USA and to take it would be easy. But it would be extremely disruptive.
5.
DT IC went on to say that the fact that the
textile industry had not made a reference to the TTC ..
led HK to suspect that the case for additional protection
could not be made. The US preferred the MFA bec use it
provided for selective safeguards. This enabled the s to take action against HK even when HK was not the principal supplier. In some recent cases the principai suppliers had been from Europe and the US had not been prepared to do anything about these. If HK was not the principal supplier, he, DTIC, could not see how restrictiv: action against HK would assist the US. Whilst he recognised
that there were political pressures for the STR, the LTA
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