TNAG-0757-FCO40-961-Strength-of-UK-armed-forces-stationed-in-Hong-Kong-1978 — Page 29

Effect on the Army

SECRET

ENNEK A CO

DP 17/78(C) (Preliminary Draft) Continued

31. Belize.

The Army Force level has increased from 600 to 1500

at the expense of forces dedicated to Priority One or home defence

roles. A large number of individual reinforcements have been made

to the Belize Force Headquarters and to form logistic detachments.

Individuals can only be drawn from other formed

Units with accom-

panying degradation of output and increase of overstretch in the

Priority One logistic units from which they are drawn. Teeth arm units

are unable to train for their Priority One role, and there is risk that

there may be insufficient time for their return to Europe in a period

of tension.

32. Cyprus. No provision was made in the 1974 Defence Review for

the Army contribution (780 men) to UNFICYP, nor for the half

battalion of infantry maintained in the Eastern SBA since the

Turkish invasion in 1974. The bulk of these deployments consist

of units from UKIF which are assigned a Priority One role.

33.

Short Term Deployments.

The Bermuda and Kolwezi operations were

of short duration and involved small numbers. The effect was negligible.

However this type of commitment involves standing to other units not

normally earmarked for Spearhead operations, with consequential detriment

to training. This disruption is more frequent than suggested by the

short list of operations undertaken; since September 1975 battalions

have been "stood to", but not deployed, as follows:

a.

Spearhead Battalion

b. Other UKLF Units

c.

BAOR units

Twice

12 times

8 times

34. Overall, operations since 1975 have had no significant direct

effect on the Army. The Army contribution to NATO was only

A - 21 SECRET