Effect on the Army
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ENNEK A CO
DP 17/78(C) (Preliminary Draft) Continued
31. Belize.
The Army Force level has increased from 600 to 1500
at the expense of forces dedicated to Priority One or home defence
roles. A large number of individual reinforcements have been made
to the Belize Force Headquarters and to form logistic detachments.
Individuals can only be drawn from other formed
Units with accom-
panying degradation of output and increase of overstretch in the
Priority One logistic units from which they are drawn. Teeth arm units
are unable to train for their Priority One role, and there is risk that
there may be insufficient time for their return to Europe in a period
of tension.
32. Cyprus. No provision was made in the 1974 Defence Review for
the Army contribution (780 men) to UNFICYP, nor for the half
battalion of infantry maintained in the Eastern SBA since the
Turkish invasion in 1974. The bulk of these deployments consist
of units from UKIF which are assigned a Priority One role.
33.
Short Term Deployments.
The Bermuda and Kolwezi operations were
of short duration and involved small numbers. The effect was negligible.
However this type of commitment involves standing to other units not
normally earmarked for Spearhead operations, with consequential detriment
to training. This disruption is more frequent than suggested by the
short list of operations undertaken; since September 1975 battalions
have been "stood to", but not deployed, as follows:
a.
Spearhead Battalion
b. Other UKLF Units
c.
BAOR units
Twice
12 times
8 times
34. Overall, operations since 1975 have had no significant direct
effect on the Army. The Army contribution to NATO was only
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