CO
* ד' +
CONFIDENTIAL
TAL
the Gurkhas, and for the Brigade as a whole. We believe that such plans, which
would apply whatever the outcome of the Anglo-Brunei talks, can and should
be prepared now.
7.
Three scenarios can be envisaged:-
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4. Neas bicle dam ཐོག་མེད་དོན་
ིནམ་
Сня
we
Nobrand
or
a. the negotiations result in the speedy conclusion of a new Treaty
of Friendship, as set out above;
b.
the negotiations are unsuccessful and there is either mutual agreement
to terminate the present arrangements, or at least sufficient goodwill
to ensure that HMG could retain such residual military training facilities
in Brunei as we readre; but the battalion in Brunei would be withdrawn;
C.
the negotiations are inconclusive, and the existing arrangements
are perpetuated until negotiations resume.
The consequences for the Ministry of Defence, and for the Brigade of Gurkhas
in particular, are explained in the succeeding paragraphs.
臀
8. Conclusion of an Anglo-Brunei Treaty. It is assumed that arrangements
whereby HMG will provide a Gurkha battalion in Brunei, paid for by the Brunei
Government, for a period of up to 5 years, would form an integral part of such
a Treaty, either written into it, or covered by a parallel exchange of letters.
In these circumstances, MOD would wish to see the Brigade of Gurkhas remain at
its present strength of 5 battalions (3 in Hong Kong, 1 in UK, 1 in Brunei), at
least until the eventual cessation of the Brunei commitment. We have embarked
on a thorough examination of Gurkha manpower, which is likely to result in
economies, and there is a strong possibility that a 5-battalion Brigade could be
supported by a trained adult strength of several hundreds less than the present
Cestablishment of 7000].
7
revised
[ASD to re-phase to provide if possible, a more
precise naised establishment. I believe that the retention of a Brigade of Gurkhas
of this size and strength should not cause any significant parliamentary or public
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