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present range of tasks. The operational, manpower and financial repercussions
which would result if British units had to be found to replace the Gurkhas
in Hong Kong, for example, would be extremely serious.
5. We choose to station an unaccompanied Gurkha battalion in the United
Kingdom rather than elsewhere, because it is here that, either as a whole or
by sub-units, the widest range of exercise opportunities are available, because
in the United Kingdom (rather than, say, in BAOR) the battalion is available for
deployment elsewhere should circumstances require (e.g. to Cyprus in 1974),
and because of the very considerable contribution it makes to the relief of
turbulence and overstretch among British units. The Gurkhas undertake a
wide variety of short-term demonstration and public duties commitments which
would otherwise fall on elements of British units. These commitments, if
undertaken by British units, would result in increased family separation
(already much greater than we would wish because of Northern Ireland etc.) as well
as disrupting their training programmes, and placing complete battalions
in baulk for emergency deployments (e.g. Spearhed whenever sub-units were
required.
Consequences of Forthcoming Negotiaitions
6.
Negotiations with the Sultan of Brunei are due to be resumed in London
on 127 June. Whilst we are reasonably optimistic that these talks will
lead to the successful conclusion of a new Anglo-Brunei Treaty of Friendship,
and associated with it provision for a Gurkha battalion to be stationed in
Brunei for a further period probably of up to 5 years, we would wish to
ensure that, whatever the outcome we can make firm plans for the future
of the Brigade of Gurkhas. In addition, HMG will clearly wish to make a
public statement at the conclusion of the negotiations, and it would be highly
desirable that this should include an announcement on the consequences for
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