TNAG-0756-FCO40-960-Strength-of-UK-armed-forces-stationed-in-Hong-Kong-1978 — Page 106

CO!

CONFIDENTIAL

TAL

ce your visit to the Ministry of Defence in August we have been

able to progress the Naval Staff Target (NST) for the replacement

of the patrol craft which form the Hong Kong Squadron to the stage

where it was endorsed by the Naval Projects Committee shortly before

Christmas. In this process the contributions and comments you and

your people made in response to our informal approaches were rost

helpful.

2. My intention in writing to you now is to let you know how we

intend to handle the project over the next few months, at the end

of which a detailed, specific Naval Staff Requirement (NSR) will

emerge. To set the scene I am attaching as an Annex a short paper

which summarises the general conclusions of the NST. You will note

that we have recommended a solution based on the provision of 5 patrol

craft, although serious consideration was given to a force comprising

a frigate and 3 patrol craft. This latter option was rejected on the

grounds that a through life cost comparison over 20 years showed such

a mixed Squadron to be more than 40% costlier than one made up of 5

patrol craft, and, of course, that experience during the past 2 years

has indicated that a Squadron comprising patrol craft only has few

operational disadvantages.

3. Director General Ships has therefore now commissioned a Craft

Study which will produce outline patrol craft options to meet the

NST. These, and comparison studies on communications and weapon

systems, should be completed and available for consideration by the

end of April. I suggest therefore that it would be appropriate for

a session of formal discussions to be held in, say, the second half

of May, between the Hong Kong Government and the Ministry of Defence,

at which we could ascertain your views, and make the necessary decisions

as to the preferred patrol craft solution, from which to tackle the NSR.

1.

CONFIDENTIAL

AL