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battalions, one RAF Regiment Field Squadron and supporting elements). The calculation assumes that we would use the westabout route, which, on completion of current negotiations with the United States' authorities, will be as "secure" as any route can be which is dependent upon use of another country's facilities. Another important assumption is that the situation has developed in such a way that there has been time to reduce the notice for the second reinforcement battalion, which unlike our Spearhead battalion is not normally at short notice to move. On this basis, the leading elements of the force could arrive in Hong Kong seventy hours after the operation was ordered (G+ 70), the first battalion would arrive within one hundred and ten hours (G+110) and the entire force in 178 hours. If however two infantry battalions only were deployed, we could get them to Hong Kong in one hundred and twenty hours (G+ 120). As with all contingency plans, these timings assume no conflict of operational priorities leading to a concurrent requirement to reinforce elsewhere. A high priority is of course given to providing reinforcements to meet current threats.
4. On the question of training, and as FCO are well aware, it has always been our wish to retain access to the training facilities in Brunei after withdrawal of the battalion. Although, unfortunately, there has been no opportunity to dis- cuss any proposals with the Sultan of Brunei, the draft note on military assistance associated with the draft Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation covers this point. If the Brunei training facilities are to continue to be available to the Hong Kong garrison at the present level, we would need to main- tain a resident training team of company strength. If develop- ments subsequent to 18 January bring us to the point of unilateral termination, the question of how, and when, we raise with the Bruneis continued access to the training facilities is one which we shall need to consider urgently with South-East Asian Department, and possibly yourself.
5. Until it is clear beyond all doubt that we will be starting to withdraw from Brunei in the course of this year, and in particular in what circumstances, we cannot make specific pro- prosals to Brunei or Hong Kong on training nor would we wish to commence formal consultations with Hong Kong on reinforcement. But if and when that point is reached we should be in a position to act quickly since we have studied the questions arising several times in connection with projected (but in the event abortive) negotiations with the Sultan of Brunei.
6.
Copies of this go to Murray Simons, South East Asian Department, and John Wilberforce (Defence Department).
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