TNAG-0741-FCO40-945-Relations-between-China-and-Hong-Kong-1978 — Page 149

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11C

(b)

to promote arms sales within the limits of

what the British Government believe to be acceptable

in strategic terms, to press for COCOM agreement to

such sales, and abide by the result;

(c) as in (b) above but, in the case of sales of particularly high commercial or industrial value to the UK, going ahead despite opposition in COCOM and

from our partners, unless the general political or

commercial objections appear to outweigh the

advantages of the sale;

(a) to promote arms sales without regard to the

results of consultations in COCO or with our partners.

56. The strategic objection to defence sales to China,

as identified in this paper, turns on whether such sales would directly increase China's offensive capability.

Many arms sales will fall short of this or will do no more

than bring forward the achievement of such a capability.

On the other hand, other states in the region and the

United States, which still has defence.commitments there, see China differently, and it would be dangerous not to

take this into account. Moreover, Britain has a strong

interest in the maintenance of COCOM, and would damage

its own interests if it defied the United States by going

ahead with a sale despite COCOM and strong American

The United States is in fact the key..

objections.

57. Against

Against this background, option (a) above can be

excluded as unduly self-denying, and option (d) as self-

destructive.

The main difference between options (b) ani

COMPTEMTIAL

/(e)

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