CONFIDENTIAL
DSR 11C
(b)
to promote arms sales within the limits of
what the British Government believe to be acceptable
in strategic terms, to press for COCOM agreement to
such sales, and abide by the result;
(c) as in (b) above but, in the case of sales of particularly high commercial or industrial value to the UK, going ahead despite opposition in COCOM and
from our partners, unless the general political or
commercial objections appear to outweigh the
advantages of the sale;
(a) to promote arms sales without regard to the
results of consultations in COCO or with our partners.
56. The strategic objection to defence sales to China,
as identified in this paper, turns on whether such sales would directly increase China's offensive capability.
Many arms sales will fall short of this or will do no more
than bring forward the achievement of such a capability.
On the other hand, other states in the region and the
United States, which still has defence.commitments there, see China differently, and it would be dangerous not to
take this into account. Moreover, Britain has a strong
interest in the maintenance of COCOM, and would damage
its own interests if it defied the United States by going
ahead with a sale despite COCOM and strong American
The United States is in fact the key..
objections.
57. Against
Against this background, option (a) above can be
excluded as unduly self-denying, and option (d) as self-
destructive.
The main difference between options (b) ani
COMPTEMTIAL
/(e)
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