TNAG-0741-FCO40-945-Relations-between-China-and-Hong-Kong-1978 — Page 145

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DSR 11C

also to the sale of (c) and (d), particularly if they

could contribute to the development of a Chinese

offensive capability. Moreover, restraints on the

transfer of industrial equipment related to defence and

of defence technology are part of President Carter's

policy on conventional arms transfer limitations. The

final US position is therefore difficult to predict.

On balance they will probably accept sales falling

within category (b), but there is likely to be dispute

over whether any particular item belongs to (a) or (b).

They are likely to be guided over (c) and (d) by whether

the end product would fall into (a) or (b). They are

likely to be strongly opposed to sales of advanced

manufacturing technology with strategic application.

Other COCOM Partners

50.

Britain's other COCOM partners, with the possible

exception of Japan, would probably not oppose British

sales of military technology and equipment to China.

The French in particular would be likely, on political

grounds, to encourage such sales, thus easing the path

for themselves. Japan's views would be strongly

influenced by those of the United States, on whom she

is largely dependent for her defence. Japan expressed

considerable concern over the Spey deal in 1975 and

would do so again for major defence sales. In cases in

which she felt really strongly, Japanese willingness to

co-operate on trade matters with the United Kingdom, let

alone to buy British defence equipment, might be reduced.

/Other countries in the region

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