TNAG-0741-FCO40-945-Relations-between-China-and-Hong-Kong-1978 — Page 117

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

Ja

CONFIDENTIAL

DSB 11C

of reducing potential

regional stability ·

(e) Hong Kong

13.

Soviet influence and promoting

Hong Kong is regarded by Feking as part of China.

Their public line is that the problem should be settled

in an appropriate way when conditions are ripe. They

have avoided being more specific. The benefits which

China receives from foreign trade and invisible earnings

through Hong Kong (enough to pay for a third of her

imports from non-communist countries) provide a strong

incentive for maintaining the status quo, as the present

leadership has recently made clear. As the expiry in

1997 of the lease on the New Territories of Hong Kong

approaches, it will become increasingly difficult to

maintain business confidence in Hong Kong. Although the

Chinese have hitherto been unwilling to discuss the

future of Hong Kong, they will almost certainly, within

be prepared

the next seven or eight years, (want to offer some sort

of assurances about the future.

(f) Taiwan

14. In contrast to Hong Kong, China Could not at present

China is unlikely to renounce force as

invade Taiwan.

a means of capturing the island, but would not make the

attempt unless she could be confident that the Americans

would not intervene to support Taiwan. As an alternative,

China may hope to arrive at an arrangement with the

/leadership

CONFIDENTLAL

D 107991 400,000 7/76 904 953

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