13.
The
Whatever the techniques and procedures perfected in training, sooner or later a physical confrontation will take place between members of the Security Forces and the public. For Royal Hong Kong Police officers thia że a situation that arises as part of their normal duties. population at large find it natural and understandable when they see the Royal Hong Kong Police deployed for ret control, Furthermore, they are likely to support strong measures by the Polics, subject to the normal constraints of minimum force, if private citizens are known to have“ suff- ered injury. This degree of tolerance would also apply to Brivish sold.... iere provided their introduction into direct confrontation with rioters is authorised only after damage and injury has been inflicted on the property and persons of peaceful citizens. In this case the introduction of the Army in support of the Police would be seen as a demonstration of strength by the Government and could be expected to 'ecol' the situation, and re-create con- fidence amongst the general public. On any such cecasion when it becomes necessary to introduce a military force to help maintain law and order the British soldier's flair for exercising good humour and restraint in the face of extreme provocation could he of significant value. The apprehensive res pact which the Hong Kong Chinese has for the Gurkha soldier and the ethnis disregard each has for the other, will also offer advantage. Thus, although the use of the Royal Hong Kong Pelice alone at the outset of an Internsl Security situation would probably be most appropriate, the subsequent iztro- duction of the military in a worsening situation would almost certainly be welcomed by Hong Kong citizens. Subject to authority for the use of the military being given by the Governor, the man best able to decide which forces to use, Police or military, and how to employ them, will normally be the Police and Military commanders in the Dietaiso PolMil. Tactical control of oper. ations should therefore be delegated to this level of command as early as practicable.
20.
CONCLUSIONS
It is concluded that :
(a) The main threat to law and order in Hong Kong will arise from
large crowds in disorder, aggravated by sporadic cutbursts of greater violence. The threat of terrorist activity also exists, but the counter-measures will normally be exercised by the Royal Hong Kong Police.
(b) The expansion of the Royal Hong Kong Polics in recent years
together with the reductions in the military garrison, mEAKS that the Royal Hong Kong Police will far outnumber the mil- itary on the ground.
(c) The general capability of the Royal Hong Kong Police to op-
erate in the Internal Security role is well developed and effective. Techniques, procedures, command and control
For flash' rict ir arrangements are of a high standard. cidents an immediate Police counter capability is avail- atle and for widespread incidents the Force can mobilise itto Internal Security stricture.
Their Inter-
(a) The Police should remain primarily responsible for restor-
ing order in an Internal Security situation. pal Security structure is expensive in manpower and they should be relieved of extraneous duties wherever possible. In the event of sporadic outbursts of greater violence, such as the emergence of snipers or gunnen, it is anticipate i
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