TNAG-0647-FCO40-795-Study-of-labour-relations-in-Hong-Kong-by-Professor-H-A-Turn-1977 — Page 132

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gone pretty well in favour of the employers. Third, the right-wing

unions are weak and unrepresentative: in the past they have often

been corrupt.

Fourth, as long as economic growth is sustained, individualism

will continue to be more rational than defensive/aggressive combina-

tions of workers which depend on strong solidarity and low mobility

for success in struggles with employers. Fifth, a population made

up of first and second generation refugees, with increasingly

limited possibilities of international migration, is likely to feel

vulnerable in the face of clear opposition by employers to collec-

tive organization of workers. HK is the last stop for many of them

and they just don't want to rock the boat. Sixth, the heterogeneity

of HK's industry and the relative volatility of its demand for

labour is not conducive to the growth of unions, which have thrived

elsewhere on large single industry concentrations and monopsonistic

employment conditions. Finally, profileration of 'unions' at both

firm and industry levels has institutionalized competition between

rival organizations, a factor strengthened by government's resist-

ance to amalgamation and federation. This has weakened the

development of a union movement for which in any case there seems

to be very limited popular support.

The part played by combinations of employers in regulating the

labour market:

If labour has virtually no collective role to play in the

labour market, the same could not be said for employers. The

general functions of employers associations we covered in our

notes; here we are concerned only with their effect on the labour

market. The information flows promoted by these organizations

have been discussed in section 2; we are now in a position to assess

the evidence for collusion between employers to regulate rates.

That collusion is normal is supported by numerous references in

the notes. Few employers readily admit to it and, as there are

no formal collective agreements either at firm or industry

levels, informal co-ordination of wages policy can easily be

passed off as "an exchange of information which in no way affects

the autonomy of individual firms". There have been and are some

determined efforts to maintain a united front on wages: the large

American electronics firms tried and failed; the British dominated