TNAG-0617-FCO40-765-Strength-and-cost-of-UK-armed-forces-stationed-in-Hong-Kong-1977 — Page 29

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CONFIDENTIAL

and because of the increasing difficulty of maintaining and supporting these

obsolescent craft. there is little practical possibility of any further

extension of their life.

4.

Although provision for the replacement of the present patrol craft was not

included in the DCA, the likelihood of such a requirement was recognised at

the time of the negotiations. After a subsequent exchange of letters between

the Secretary for Security of the Hong Kong Government and MOD it was agreed

that "if expenditure on the new patrol craft should be required during the

period of the (Defence Costs) agreement we would expect costs to be shared on the

same basis as those of the remainder of the garrison. The cost of the patrol

craft will depend on the requirement and the scale, nature and timing of

the replacement, which cannot yet be decided; but in view of the need for

decisions to be taken well before the first craft is due for replacement

(because of the lead time for ordering) we consider that the question should

be the subject of a joint study which we suggest should be set up about 1978". (1)

THE NEED FOR A FOYAL NAVY PRESENCE IN HONG KONG

·

5.

The continuing need for a Royal Navy presence in Hong Kong is an essential

part of the justification for any replacement for the existing patrol craft.

Such a presence is part of a balanced force of all three services, which is

necessary to maintain the confidence of the Colony in HMG's willingness

and ability to sustain the Hong Kong Government, It is difficult to

envisage other than the continuation of this requirement, which was reflected

in the text of the Agreed Joint Statement issued when the Heads of Agreemen.

were initialled by the then Minister of State and the Governor of Hong Kong

on 1 November 1975. The view of both Governmcuts was set out as follows:

(1) AUS(GS) 91/76 dated 23 February 1976

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