TNAG-0617-FCO40-765-Strength-and-cost-of-UK-armed-forces-stationed-in-Hong-Kong-1977 — Page 159

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Min Millin

GR 500

IMMEDIATE

DESKBY 170900Z

CYPHER/CAT A

FM HONG KONG 170715Z

SECRET

DESKBY 170900Z-

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 500 OF 17 MAY.

YOUR TEL 376: BRUNEI. zee

FOR MURRAY A.U.S.S.

LAZY

REF.

MACROTKY KO. 51 3 0 MAY 1977

INCK 062/2

IN THE JOINT WORKING PARTY REPORT OF MARCH 75, THE PREFERRED ARMY GARRISON WAS 5 2/3 MAJOR UNITS. (PARAGRAPH 29) ANY LESSER OPTION HAD 'SECURITY DEFICIENCIES'' (PARAGRAPH 47) WHICH COULD BE REDUCED SIGNIFICANTLY IF THE FOURTH GURKHA BATTALION COULD BE

HELD OUTSIDE HONG KONG BUT AVAILABLE AS A REINFORCEMENT IN ADVANCE OF A POSSIBLE BATTALION FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM.

2. IT WAS ALWAYS APPRECIATED AT THE TIME THAT THE ''SECOND

'SECOND BEST SOLUTION OF 4 1/3 MAJOR UNITS WOULD BE VERY MUCH MORE ACCEPTABLE

IF A FURTHER BATTALION FAMILIAR WITH HONG KONG WERE AVAILABLE IN

THE AREA FOR RAPID REINFORCEMENT, E.G. A GURKHA BATTALION FROM BRUNE!. IF THE ONLY REINFORCEMENT WERE FROM THE UK, THE RISK WOULD

BE GREATER.

3. NOTHING HAS HAPPENED LOCALLY TO CHANGE THIS APPRECIATION,

REINFORCEMENT TIMINGS WERE EXPRESSED AS 'NOT MORE THAN 3 WEEKS FROM UK AND FROM BRUNEI ABOUT 1 WEEK''

4. THE HK GARRISON HAS ONLY HAD 5 MONTHS EXPERIENCE OF OPERATING

AT THE 4 1/3 LEVEL, SO IT IS TOO SOON TO MAKE AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW

THIS WILL WORK OUT IN PRACTICE. HOWEVER, WE CERTAINLY CANNOT DO WITH (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) LESS THAN 4 1/3 AND OUR REINFORCEMENT REQUIREMENT REMAINS AS SET OUT IN PARA 39 OF THE WORKING PARTY

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/REPORT