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If a
c) The reinforcement lead time from Brunei is theoretically shorter than from the UK. It is easier for you in London to assess what validity there in this assumption than for me. But certainly a reinforcement capability is judged essential and I think rightly. I must admit that I cannot easily foresee a situation in which the sheer numerical aspect of reinforcement of the garrison at 4 days rather than 3 weeks notice is likely to make much difference. situation arose in which a strengthened garrison is necessary we are likely to see it coming for some time. But one cannot be sure of this and certainly I can see a situation in which the psychological effect of even quite a small reinforcement at short notice might be very helpful. It is in this latter connection that the presence of a battalion in Brunei, at no expense to HMG, could be so helpful, provided the Sultan would agree to one or two companies moving here at short notice.
d) I am also concerned that if a need for reinforcement did arise, and the only source was the UK, commitments to NATO and Northern Ireland might have to take precedence. There is therefore great merit from Hong Kong's point of view in an alternative source such as Brunei.
Finally, in broader terms, to cut the garrison by 1/3 at the outset of such an uncertain period in China involved a calculated if in my opinion rather small risk. Until things have settled down it is a great comfort to know that an additional battalion is in the South-East Asian area and can be called upon if necessary.
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The combination of these arguments produces a very strong argument, from Hong Kong's point of view for the retention of the battalion in Brunei.
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Muay
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