TNAG-0617-FCO40-765-Strength-and-cost-of-UK-armed-forces-stationed-in-Hong-Kong-1977 — Page 135

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evident undesirability of any rerercussions

for the DCA, are points to which full

recognition has been paid in the MOD's

consideration of policy for further

consultations with Brunei; but Hong Kong

aspects have not been seen as overriding

HMG's agreed policy of seeking to end our

political and military commitment to Brunei.

The final outcome of the negotiations

with the Sultan cannot of course be

preäicted - nor indeed can timing, since

there is now some uncertainty as to whether

it will be possible to bring ratters to any

conclusion this Summer bu: the essential

question is not whether we withdraw from

Brunei but when. Although it is not

impossible that withdrawal. could be

deferred for some years if that were the key

to an otherwise satisfactory agreement, it

rerains HMG's first position to seek early

withdrawal (which in practice means 1979) in

any negotiations that in fact take place this Eny nesptation our ey

year.

As to consultation with the Hong Kong Government, these have been envisaged as being

limited to prior notice of the date of withdrawal

from Brunei and discussions on its implications

for Hong Kong's security requirement,

icluding if necessary detailed study of

reinforcement options and stationed force

levels.

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