TNAG-0616-FCO40-764-Policy-of-UK-on-status-of-Hong-Kong-1977 — Page 62

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DSK TIC

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political, economic and commercial terms than any possible

gain in China. Even in the limited field of defence sales,

the US market is far more important than the Chinese. It

would not be worth risking the future of the two-way street

for the sake of a sale to China.

19. The US Administration's assessment of the strategic

considerations surrounding arms sales is likely to be simila

to that set out in this paper. For historical and emotional

reasons, American public and congressional opinion is likely

to lag behind the Administration. Nevertheless, even public

opinion has eased in recent years. Even though the

Americans themselves will not, for the foreseeable future,

feel in a position to sell arms to China, they are likely

not to oppose all sales from other Western countries.

Dr Kissinger has already set a precedent by helping the

British Government to put the Spey engine sale through

COCOM. But the Americans are likely to draw a distinction

between advanced technology and offensive weapons which

would significantly increase China's offensive and long

range capability or create a qualitative jump on the one

hand, and lower level technology and defensive equipment

on the other. They can be expected to oppose sales of the

former. (This would in any case be in line with President

Carter's initiative on the limitation of conventional arms

transfers.) On the latter there may be divided counsels.

Some Americans may argue in favour of arms sales as a means

of strengthening China against the Soviet Union. Others

will resist on traditional grounds or on the grounds that

such sales might upset East-West or US-Soviet relations.

Many A would probably object to the sale of factories and

/know-how

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