1
DSK TIC
CONFIDENTIAL
political, economic and commercial terms than any possible
gain in China. Even in the limited field of defence sales,
the US market is far more important than the Chinese. It
would not be worth risking the future of the two-way street
for the sake of a sale to China.
19. The US Administration's assessment of the strategic
considerations surrounding arms sales is likely to be simila
to that set out in this paper. For historical and emotional
reasons, American public and congressional opinion is likely
to lag behind the Administration. Nevertheless, even public
opinion has eased in recent years. Even though the
Americans themselves will not, for the foreseeable future,
feel in a position to sell arms to China, they are likely
not to oppose all sales from other Western countries.
Dr Kissinger has already set a precedent by helping the
British Government to put the Spey engine sale through
COCOM. But the Americans are likely to draw a distinction
between advanced technology and offensive weapons which
would significantly increase China's offensive and long
range capability or create a qualitative jump on the one
hand, and lower level technology and defensive equipment
on the other. They can be expected to oppose sales of the
former. (This would in any case be in line with President
Carter's initiative on the limitation of conventional arms
transfers.) On the latter there may be divided counsels.
Some Americans may argue in favour of arms sales as a means
of strengthening China against the Soviet Union. Others
will resist on traditional grounds or on the grounds that
such sales might upset East-West or US-Soviet relations.
Many A would probably object to the sale of factories and
/know-how
CONFIDENTIAL
D 107991 400,000 7/76 904 953