TNAG-0616-FCO40-764-Policy-of-UK-on-status-of-Hong-Kong-1977 — Page 37

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11C

Americans objected strongly. The United States is in

fact the key.

37.

Against this background, options (a) and (d) above

can be excluded. Options (b) and (c) are similar, the

main difference being that in one the UK should be

prepared to push further than COCOM and our partners

would countenance in the hope that they would acquiesce

in a fait accompli. In principle option (b) is the

preferable one, accommodating as it would most of our

interests. However it might be important to keep in

reserve the right to proceed anyway as a means of inducing

reluctant partners to agree to changes in the COCOM rules

which we believe to be justified on their merits. Option

(c) might therefore be kept in reserve; whether to use

it would be a matter of judgment at the time.

38. If this analysis is accepted it will be necessary

for HMG to consult the Americans at an early stage of

serious Chinese interest in any item of British defence

equipment. Such an approach would need to be based on an

intention to open discussion with the Chinese which we

could justify in the terms of this paper, rather than

simply a request for US views. When and how we consulted

our other partners in COCOM would generally depend

initially on US reactions. But there may be a case for

early consultations with the French, as the other major

potential arms supplier to China, for an exchange of

views on the political and strategic implications.

should be in a much stronger position talking to the

Americans if we were confident of the French attitude.

/At

We

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