CONFIDENTIAL
DSR 11C
Americans objected strongly. The United States is in
fact the key.
37.
Against this background, options (a) and (d) above
can be excluded. Options (b) and (c) are similar, the
main difference being that in one the UK should be
prepared to push further than COCOM and our partners
would countenance in the hope that they would acquiesce
in a fait accompli. In principle option (b) is the
preferable one, accommodating as it would most of our
interests. However it might be important to keep in
reserve the right to proceed anyway as a means of inducing
reluctant partners to agree to changes in the COCOM rules
which we believe to be justified on their merits. Option
(c) might therefore be kept in reserve; whether to use
it would be a matter of judgment at the time.
38. If this analysis is accepted it will be necessary
for HMG to consult the Americans at an early stage of
serious Chinese interest in any item of British defence
equipment. Such an approach would need to be based on an
intention to open discussion with the Chinese which we
could justify in the terms of this paper, rather than
simply a request for US views. When and how we consulted
our other partners in COCOM would generally depend
initially on US reactions. But there may be a case for
early consultations with the French, as the other major
potential arms supplier to China, for an exchange of
views on the political and strategic implications.
should be in a much stronger position talking to the
Americans if we were confident of the French attitude.
/At
We
CONFIDENTIAL
D 107991 400,000 7/76 904 953