3.
SFCKET
the continuation of Hong Kong in something like its present form. If they do, it should be possible to arrive at an arrangement that for some further time would ensure our essential interests and those of the population, because unless they were ensured Hong Kong would disintegrate, and in consequence cease to be of much value to China. Such an arrangement would gain time in which economic development and improved living standards on the mainland might make it more tolerable, and the prospect of Chinese administration less frightening to the Hong Kong population, and thus ease our problem. Political concessions to China in Hong Kong would be an essential element in such an arrange- ment, so we should retain any we could make until the time to attempt such an arrangement has arrived in the '80s.
7.
But in dealing with a country like China it is never possible to be certain of the future and by the 1980s their economic and political priorities may have changed. Such a change could lead them to seek the recovery of Hong Kong. Even if this happened they ought still to have some interest in achieving a rendition that would minimise the likelihood of the developments described in Para. 5, or indeed of exposing themselves to taking over the Colony in circumstances which were clearly repugnant to the population.
I can best develop my argument in detail
in the form of question and answer.
8.
Since present relations are so good, and the status quo so valuable to China, would not this be a good time to negotiate a long-term arrangement?
a)
b)
No, because:-
the present Chinese leaders have already told us, at the highest level, that they are content to leave things as they are for a long time to come.
The Chinese Government cannot be expected to decide now whether economic and political factors in China will make it desirable to continue special arrangements for Hong Kong in the mid-80s, and if so for how long.
CERT
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