TNAG-0568-FCO40-701-Planning-paper-on-Hong-Kong-1976 — Page 176

2.

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probably ungovernable, and thus invited Chinese intervention. This despatch is about what might be

done, and when, to meet this longterm problem.

4.

The text of this despatch has

been agreed with H.M. Ambassador, Peking, and I am greatly indebted for many amendments of his incorporated in it.

The danger of creating a refugee problem

5.

I should begin by emphasising that so long as conditions in China are so harshly authoritarian any change in Hong Kong which the population believed to foreshadow the end of British rule would carry considerable risks for H.M.G. The population has migrated to Hong Kong for the sake of conditions preferable to those in China. It is pathologically prone to over-reaction, and any change or prospect of change of status could loose a flood of hundreds of thousands of singularly active refugees, who, whatever their legal status (and many would have British passports) would have more claim on H.M.G. than any other government. It could also result in capital and/or commercial loss not only for the U.K., but for Japan, the United States and many other countries. this resulted from an initiative of ours H.M.G. would be held accountable for the humanitarian and financial

consequences.

Summary of argument

6.

If

In the following paragraphs I have set out my argument in some detail as to how things might be handled so as to avoid such a catastrophe. But in the simplest terms it is as follows: it would be pointless to attempt to discuss now with the Chinese leaders what should be done in the mid-80s, because they are not ready to do so, and because in any case they will probably be dead before that time comes. it does come everything will depend on whether or not the Chinese then decide that the benefits they derive from Hong Kong are still of sufficient value to justify

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When

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