TNAG-0554-FCO40-649-Review-of-death-sentence-in-Hong-Kong-1975 — Page 172

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that we shall not refer to them. It was argued that the learned

judge summed up the evidence unfairly in several respects.

Thus it is said that he dismissed discrepancies in the police evidence as "not surprising" but emphasised discrepancies in the defence evidence. The truth is that in the passage relied

upon for the first limb of this contention the judge was not

referring merely to discrepancies in the police evidence but

was stating a few words about discrepancies generally, whether in the vidence adduced by the Crown or by the defence. Then it is pointed out that the judge omitted to mention an admission by MOK Fai that part of his evidence was untrue. However, there is no obligation upon a judge to mention every piece of evidence.

Had the judge referred to the evidence which was later contradicted in such a way as to suggest that it stood uncontradicted, there would have been a valid objection. Nothing of the sort happened

here.

On the contrary the judge cxpressly mentioned a difference between this witness's evidence at the trial from that he gave in the magistrate's court. As to the fourth Applicant it is submitted that his defence was not dealt with at as great length as were the defences of the first and second Applicants, yet Mr. Bernacchi concedes that no material part of the evidence adduced on behalf of the fourth Applicant was omitted. We think that no more was required. Then it was contented that the jury were left with the impression that a statement by the first Applicant referring to the second Applicant was evidence against the second Applicant. What happened was this. The first Applicant was asked whether at the time he was arrested he thought the second Applicant had told the police the whole truth and he replied in the affirmative. It is conceded that the question was not open to objection and that no objection was in fact taken. This question was asked because the prosecution sought to establish that the first Applicant, at the time he made his statement, believed that the police knew what had taken place so that his confession was the result of thinking a denial to be bootless and not the result of inducement by the police, as suggested in examination-in-chief.

We agree with counsel for the Crown that the second Applicant could not have been prejudiced by this quotation of an admissible questi ́n and of the answer given to it: it did not implicate the second Applicant in any way.

The last matter upon which we intend to comment is the