TNAG-0554-FCO40-649-Review-of-death-sentence-in-Hong-Kong-1975 — Page 171

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Nevertheless there were among the passages complained of a majority of instances where the interruptions by the judge could be

justified on one of the following grounds:

(i)

clearing up an ambiguity or obscurity of language (although sometimes it was doubtful whether counsel might

not have put the necessary questions without intervention by the judge);

(ii) correcting counsel or interpreter;

(iii) insisting on an answer to counsel's question (although

this again would have been better left to counsel themselves); confirming that he had correctly heard an answer just given; checking that evidence was not hearsay;

(iv)

(v)

(vi) clearing up what the judge thought to be a misunderstanding

between counsel and witness and thus shortening the trial; (vii) ascertaining the time or place of events being described. (This list does not, of course, include instances where the initial interruption was by counsel in objection to a question and where the judge merely proceeded to hear argument and to rule upon the objection.) We cannot emphasise too strongly that a judge should never interrupt the examination of a witness unless it is absolutely essential. As a corollary to that, it is the duty of counsel to put all necessary questions, so that questioning by the judge should not normally be required. Where it is required, it should so far as possible be postponed until counsel has finished with the witness. Where there have, as here, been unjustifiable interruptions the appellate court has to assess as best it can the degree of prejudice which has resulted, for it is only where the effect has been to prevent counsel's adequately presenting the defence or where the judge has indicated bias against the defendant that a conviction will be set aside. Although this case has given us great anxiety we are all agreed that the prejudice did not reach the point where we ought to interfere.

In the event all the remaining grounds of appeal were relied upon only to the extent that it was said they rendered the verdicts unsafe or unsatisfactory and we point out that any contention not in itself sufficient reason for the court's interfering should not have been included as a substantive ground of appeal. Most of these remaining grounds were so manifestly without substance