TNAG-0544-FCO40-639-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1975 — Page 179

Layy

CHIEF OF

31 OCT1975

1

DEFENCE STAFF

Cop

30/10

1

DATE:

CDS

VCDS

334/E

HJ SCDS(A) ¦

SCDC A i

SCD A

R

CWR008 31/1030 304C1066

FOR CWR

IMMEDIATE 310910Z OCT

FROM

ΤΟ

CBF HONG KONG.

MODUK

SECRET

DIG WWW/LGB

PERSONAL FOR CDS FROM C3FHK

SECRET

BY

HAND

FURTHER COSSEC

DISTRIBUTION

DATE 31 Oct 75 PSO/CDS | ACDS (POL) | I SEC/CNS|! | ACDS (OPS) |

MA/CGS PS/CAS CPL

AUS D. STAFF IDS 6

DUS (P)

(P) | |

གས

DCDS (1)

Hd Scost:

SCDS B 1

SCDS B 2

SPC

ADC

FLOAT

SERIES

ONE PD YOU WILL HAVE SEEN SIGNALS SENT BY MINISTER OF STATE AND ALSO BY THE GOVERNOR ON HIS OWN NET TO THE FCO AND YOU WILL GATHER THAT NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN CMM AS I ANTICIPATED CMM EXTREMELY TOUGH ANDTHE POSITION OF UNOFFICIALS PRETTY VOLATILE AND INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT PD THERE WAS A MOMENT ON THURSDAY WHEN IT LOOKED AS IF WE WERE IN SIGHT OF AN AGREEMENT ON A HARD FOUGHT COMPROMISE CMM BUT SINCE THEN HONG KONGS LATE INSISTENCE ON OUR PRECIPITATE HANDING BACK TO THEM OF BOTH VICTORIA 3KS AND RAF KAI TAK CMM IN ADDITION TO THE VERY CONSIDERABLE RELEASE OF LAND ALREADY PLANNED AS PART OF THE DEFENCE REVIEW CMM HAS BECOME A MAJOR ISSUE TWO P AM CLEAR IN MY OWN MIND THAT THE SACRIFICE OF VICTORIA SKS APART FROM A FEW SPALL FACILITIES WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE RETAINED SHOULD PRESENT NO INSUPERABLE PROBLEMS IN THE FUTURE CMM AND GIVEN

PAGE 2 RBMYAD 060 SECRET

A REALISTIC TIME SCALE AND FULL REPROVISION AT HONG KONGS EXCLUSIVE EXPENSE CMM WOULD BE ASCUND AND SENSIBLE THING IN ITSELF PD THE PROVISION WOULD BEST BE WITHIN HMS TAMAR WHICH COULD

I TIME BE MADE INTO AN EXCELLENT JOINT SET-UP CLN AND WHEREAS THERE IS AMPLE JUSTIFICATION FOR A SINGLE BRITISH FORCES PRESENCE - IN CENTRAL CMM THERE CAN REALLY BE NO JUSTIFICATION FOR TWO

THREE PD RAF KAI TAK PRESENTS MORE OF AN IMMEDIATE AND FINELY BALANCED PROBLEM PD CONSIDERING THE STRENGTH OF THE RAF WE CAN HARDLY JUSTIFY CHM UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES CMM THE RETENTION OF 122 ACRES IN THE CENTRE OF THE CITY PD THE ABANDONMENT HOWEVER OF THE ENTIRE RAF PRESENCE AT KAI TAK COULD MEAN OUR FOREGOING OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY ADVANTAGES CONNECTED WITH THE RECEPTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF REINFORCEMENTS ABOUT WHICH THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT SHOULD ITSELF BE CONCERNED BUT WHICH UNDER FINANCIAL PRESSURE IT IS NOW PREPARED TO FOREGO PD A TRANSFER OF THE RAF HELICOPTERS TO SEK KONG CMM WHICH INCIDENTALLY WAS ONCE SUGGESTED BY THE AIR STAFF CMM AND AT A COST TO HONG KONG OF A MINIMUM OF SIX HILLION POUNDS STERLING WOULD ALSO HAVE SOME OTHER MINOR DISADVNTAES CLN IT WOULD COMPLICATE AND ADD TO THE COST OF ACCOMMODATING A GURKHA BATTALION FROM BRUNEI SHOULD THIS BECOME

C