TNAG-0542-FCO40-637-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1975 — Page 101

SECRET

Treasury Chambers

Parliament Street London SW1P 3AG

Telex 262405

A J WARD ESQ

DS 6

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING

WHITEHALL

LONDON S W 1

Telephone 01-930 1234 ext

555

LANT

RS.

280

NEXT

REF.

288

Your reference

Our reference

Date

25 September 1975

HONG KONG

Thank you for sending us a copy of your minute of 19 September, about which we subsequently spoke.

I agree that the problem of what to say about reinforcement from Brunei is a difficult one. Not only are the unofficials likely to be aware, as you say, of the link in the joint working party report between the 4 unit garrison and the possibility of local reinforcement, but we can reasonably assume that they will be aware of our announced intention to withdraw from Brunei. On the other hand, we think it is important to avoid not only prejudicing the negotiations with the Sultan, but also any commitment to do more than review the position with Hong Kong if and when the Brunei battalion is withdrawn. As the Chief Secretary indicated in July we do not think it right to regard the reduction to a 43 garrison as dependent on the continued presence of the Gurkha battalion in Brunei and accordingly our position is entirely reserved on whether the Hong Kong garrison should be increased when the Brunei battalion goes.

Against this background we would suggest the following slight modification of your suggested reply to the Governor's query: (which I have drafted in a form which could be used in the telegram:-

"As regards paragraph 6 of your telno 924 the capability of reinforcement from the UK will, of course, remain, and in addition the Gurkha battalion in Brunei is at present available for more rapid local reinforcement. As you know, one of the Defence Review decisions was that, subject to consultations with the Sultan, we propose to withdraw the Gurkha battalion from Brunei. The se consultations are not yet complete, we cannot therefore speculate about when the battalion will be withdrawn or about what the consequences for Hong Kong might be, and we should strongly prefer to avoid being drawn into discussions with the unofficials on this point.

We suggest therefore that you should not volunteer a statement on reinforcement. If asked, you could say that the capability for reinforcement from the UK would continue. For the time being there would also be the possibility of reinforcement from the Gurkha battalion in Brunei, but this situation could change since HMG was in the process of consulting the Sultan of Brunei

Jover