TNAG-0541-FCO40-636-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1975 — Page 123

squadron, and a Naval presence but that this fore would need';

paprel.__. reinforcement should

on

tural areas,

the border, and in the

troubl

occur Smúult an

aneously

torras.

-10

gamissmcnudd Benyotcfurthan reduced throne wf-the-battaliona-WEDE stukiened outsilering-Kongʻ brocvailable for rapid nainforcementi

OffORCHERYHnízırıqooted to procedatifer-Vorstidasam thruaty. The Chiefs of Staff have endorsed these conclusions and consider that the Naval presence should comprise the frigate and the engineer presence a field squadron and its training wing. They also consider, in the new situation of deferred withdrawal from Brunei, that for so long as a battalion remains in Brunei as local reinforcement, (until mid 1978 on present assumptions), with slower reinforcement available from UK, the garrison in Hong Kong need include only 4 stationed infantry battalions.// The continued presence of the patrol boats and the artillery battery - would have military advantages but, with current pressures on the

Defence Budget, the Chiefs of Staff agree with the report that these cannot be justified as essential. If the Hong Kong Govt. press for inclusion of these elementthey would have to bear the

of them full cost! The garrison resulting from this assessment is shown

wana

at Annex A and ceston this

increased risk-and

wond cost

₤331⁄2m. however it weaves

ま

the IFMeat nucst be kept under

писте

• regulas reviews. The position wir have to be reviewed prosto

the withdrawal of the baciation from Brunei.

·3

The Hong Kong Contribution

The Governor has taken (informal] soundings of the unofficial members of the Hong Kong Government and has reported that his earlier view remains valid that the maximum that Hong Kong can