squadron, and a Naval presence but that this fore would need';
paprel.__. reinforcement should
on
tural areas,
the border, and in the
troubl
occur Smúult an
aneously
torras.
-10
gamissmcnudd Benyotcfurthan reduced throne wf-the-battaliona-WEDE stukiened outsilering-Kongʻ brocvailable for rapid nainforcementi
OffORCHERYHnízırıqooted to procedatifer-Vorstidasam thruaty. The Chiefs of Staff have endorsed these conclusions and consider that the Naval presence should comprise the frigate and the engineer presence a field squadron and its training wing. They also consider, in the new situation of deferred withdrawal from Brunei, that for so long as a battalion remains in Brunei as local reinforcement, (until mid 1978 on present assumptions), with slower reinforcement available from UK, the garrison in Hong Kong need include only 4 stationed infantry battalions.// The continued presence of the patrol boats and the artillery battery - would have military advantages but, with current pressures on the
Defence Budget, the Chiefs of Staff agree with the report that these cannot be justified as essential. If the Hong Kong Govt. press for inclusion of these elementthey would have to bear the
of them full cost! The garrison resulting from this assessment is shown
wana
at Annex A and ceston this
increased risk-and
wond cost
₤331⁄2m. however it weaves
ま
the IFMeat nucst be kept under
писте
• regulas reviews. The position wir have to be reviewed prosto
the withdrawal of the baciation from Brunei.
·3
The Hong Kong Contribution
The Governor has taken (informal] soundings of the unofficial members of the Hong Kong Government and has reported that his earlier view remains valid that the maximum that Hong Kong can