TNAG-0538-FCO40-633-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1975 — Page 52

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

the other would avoid any increase in expenditure over the level

upon which we had decided.

5. We fully endorse the hope expressed in your letter that

compensation for our reductions will ultimately be forthcoming

through increased co-operation within NATO by means of rationali-

sation, specialisation and standardisation; through further

exploitation of co-operative equipment programmes in NATO; and

through the re-allocation of resources from overheads and support

units to combat capabilities.

The

we propose, in

6. Your letter lays considerable stress on the political and

military consequences which our proposals are judged to have for

NATO's Southern Region. I recognise of course that there are

effects on the Southern Region; it was indeed implicit in the

priorities which we chose that this should be so. However, I

do not believe it right for that effect to be over-stated.

facts are that we propose to remain in Gibraltar;

present circumstances, to remain in Cyprus (though at a reduced

level of strength); and we shall remain in Malta until the

expiry of the Military Facilities Agreement in 1979. This being

said, I do accept that we should consider some of the compensatory

measures for the Mediterranean mentioned in your letter and in

the Military Committee memorandum, so long as they can be accom-

plished without any significant extra cost. As regards operations

in war, it will be clear from our original proposals that the

maritime and air forces withdrawn from the Mediterranean will be

assigned to SACLANT; any deployment of those forces to the

Mediterranean in time of war would in our view have to come about

CONFIDENTIAL

C-3

CONFIDENTIAL