TNAG-0538-FCO40-633-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1975 — Page 51

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3.

As you know, by far the greater part of our total defence

effort is already committed to the Alliance. Moreover, as

your own letter makes clear, the present British contribution

to NATO covers all regions of allied defence including the

maritime areas. It follows from this that any significant

reduction in the British defence effort is bound to have some

eflect on the Alliance as a whole. We believed therefore that

it was necessary for us to make choices; the proposals which

Sir Edward Peck and Field Marshal Sir Michael Carver put for-

ward last December were based on our judgement of the key areas

to which the UK could most effectively continue to contribute.

At the same time we made it clear that the decision which the

British Government had taken on the level of resources which

could be devoted to defence over the next 10 years was a firm

one. It followed from this that any changes in our proposed

contribution which would have the effect of increasing the level

of expenditure beyond that which we had fixed would have to be

accompanied by proposals for reduction in other areas. In other

words, we could only proceed on this basis if there were some

disposition on the part of the Alliance to question the priorities

which we had chosen.

4.

It is clear from your letter that the DPC does not feel

able to come forward with a view on the priority areas which

differs substantially from that taken by my colleagues and

myself. We are thus left with the question whether there are

any measures which we can take which might on the one hand go

some way to meet the concern of our NATO Allies but which on

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